This paper explores the debate on the relationship between marketing and propaganda through an analysis of social marketing as a mode of governmentality in 'permanent campaigning'. The paper argues that social marketing operations are agitational rather than propagandistic, and the claim is investigated through an analysis of the UK government campaign against benefit fraud during the New Labour administration, the most expensive government campaign to date -with a budget as large as McDonalds spent on promoting the Big Mac.
Introduction
In the turn to Post-Fordism, a political and economic model that carries forward and displaces Fordism, communication has become a key aspect of processes of valorisation. This turn has by some been described as the linguistic turn of political economy, making studies of language directly relevant to the analysis of capitalism, and marketing has emerged as a discipline concerned with the production of value by means of communication (Marazzi, 2008) . 1 This linguistic turn reflects how the economic has come to invest the whole of subjectivity, blurring the separation between business and society. In Post-Fordism, our linguistic and affective abilities are put to work as much as our bodies and physical energies. This entails a phenomenology of 'subsumption' with advertising at the sensible surface, ethics forming the reflexive linguistic boundaries, and strategy at the productive core. In my view, marketing captures the symptomatology of Post-Fordist capitalism and the phenomenology of this subsumption.
By addressing the question of social and political marketing, we aim to explore how business redefines these spheres, how it manages and incorporates otherness and forges new forms of social identity. Because of the confusion of the boundaries between business and society, all that concerns the latter becomes open to the intervention of the former, its techniques, codes, language and strategies. As marketing once drew from the aesthetics and techniques of politics 1 Value here is intended as an economic and political category that measures the worth of the output of human activity.
it relates to marketing, to question whether propaganda is an adequate denomination of the process of communication that was once geared to shape people's opinions and their making sense of and ultimately complying with political decisions. In other words, when it comes to the marketing of ideas in the social and political spheres, is propaganda a useful analytical tool? I will look into this by way of an analysis of the techniques and strategies that the UK government uses in its campaigns, through a particular study of its 'war against benefit fraud'.
As stated earlier, crucial to the analysis is the demise of propaganda as a mode of presentation of a political project to an audience made up of citizens with voting power with the view of persuading them of its value and desirability. In its neutral sense, propaganda was a manner of disseminating information, irrespective of whether this was perceived to be partisan, neutral or deliberately deceitful.
My contention is that the term propaganda by itself does not account for the desired effect of the strategies employed in social marketing. This is because in the age of spindoctoring (Franklin, 2004 ) the informational content of the addresses of government to citizens has shrunk to insignificance. The priority of social marketing is to directly influence mass behaviour. In this context, it is useful to go back to an old distinction first proposed by Plekhanov and later revisited by Lenin: The propagandist, dealing with, say, the question of unemployment, must explain the capitalistic nature of crises, the cause of their inevitability in modern society, the necessity for the transformation of this society into a socialist society, etc. In a word, he must present "many ideas", so many indeed, that they will be understood as an integral whole by a (comparatively) few persons. The agitator however, speaking on the same subject, will take as an illustration the death of an unemployed worker's family from starvation, the growing impoverishment etc and utilising this fact, known to all, will direct his efforts to presenting a single idea to the "masses". Consequently the propagandist operates chiefly by means of the printed word; the agitator by means of the spoken word. (Lenin, 1973: 83) Are we to speak of postmodern social marketing as a form of propaganda or agitation? In our view, as result of a generalised immunisation to political discourse, 'agitation' better describes these strategies because their object is the semio-affective sphere and their objective is to influence behaviour before consciousness or opinion. We contend that agitation helps us describe the lexicon of the moulding of Post-Fordist subjectivity as it takes place in the market place and through the selling of commodities, equally so when these are public policies.
Agitation directly refers to the incitement of the masses to act on single issues. The means used to this end are semio-affective in character and do not target particular groups or their interests but a universal disposition to feel, interpret, empathise and act. In the classical distinction, agitation is possible when there is a certain mass level of consciousness. As we shall see, the government is not capable on its own of setting the political agenda which is in a large part determined by the Fourth Estate. For this reason, the agitation it uses is more nuanced than Lenin's 'peace, bread, land': it tries to react to and shape a pre-existing public opinion. For this reason, it is a propagandistic form of agitation, it aims at the commensurability of a set number of all of its agitational campaigns.
The demise of propaganda as a political tool of consensus formation or manufacture emerges as a result of the discourse of 'There Is No Alternative' (TINA). In this context, the demise of propaganda reflects that of competing world views and projects in the political arena, where governments do not operate as sovereign executives of a representative democracy but as managers of the nation's economy. TINA significantly takes the impetus out of political strategies with the neutralisation of ideological struggles and the flattening out of meaningful differences. This process is also relevant to the shift towards governmentality and away from juridical notions of sovereignty and legitimacy, which reflects a crisis of representation and dislocates the scope of political debate and struggle (Foucault, 2000; Schecter, 2005; Hardt and Negri, 2000) . The crisis of representation points to a gap in the mediation between the government and people that was once filled by propaganda. (Foucault, 2000: 221) .
Although I largely agree with the above statement and diagnosis of contemporary institutional power, I would emphasise that governmentality today is not simply a defensive attempt at containing and preventing social and political conflict, but importantly a powerful instrument of proactive intervention in it.
As an example of the above, in what follows I will show how the strategic objectives and the informational and affective content of a recent UK government campaign to target benefit fraud demonstrate this form of commensurate propagandistic agitation.
Background
Unemployment is a socio-economic reality inherent to the workings of a system based on the social relation between capital and labour. Levels of unemployment in national economies are regulated by markets and since the beginning of political economy, equilibrium between demand and supply in this sector has been either an unfulfilled ambition or an undesirable goal.
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In recent years the welfare state and strategies to address the question of unemployment have drastically changed, as has the discourse about them (Alcock et al., 2003) .
Of particular interest for our purposes is to view these strategies in the context of the UK government of New Labour, which ran between 1997 and 2010 and solidified a trend, initiated by the Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher, that has been described as the 'public relations state' (Connor, 2007; Deacon and Golding, 1994; Wring, 2005) . Arguably, the public relations state is an update of traditional forms of propaganda. It aims to 'take the risk out of democracy' (Carey, 1997) and is essential when the institutional structure is vulnerable to public opinion. Undoubtedly the emergence of the public relations state increased the professionalization of the production of propaganda, and the attempt to salvage this technique from its pejorative connotations was the first step towards an intensification in the use of marketing as a crucial governmental tool (L'Etang, 1998).
When taking office in 1997, the New Labour Party eagerly tried to turn a language of rights or entitlements into one of responsibilities or duties. Fresh into Number 10, Tony Blair declared that the welfare state was 'associated with fraud, abuse, laziness, a dependency culture, social irresponsibility encouraged by welfare dependency' (Blair, 1999) . Following the lead of the Clinton administration in the US, the new government piloted its welfare-to-work programme, aimed at tackling problems of poverty through the labour market and to 'lift people out of benefits' (Driver and Martell, 2005) . In this sense, rather than intervening in society to assuage the (destructive) effects of the market, the government 'has to intervene on society as such, so that competitive mechanisms can play a regulatory role at every moment and every point in society and by intervening in this way its objective will become possible, that is to say, a general regulation of society by the market' (Foucault, 2008: 145) . Frank Field, Minister of Welfare Reform at the time and author of Losing Out. The Emergence of Britain's Underclass, believed that many in this group 'now simply despise those who are on the inside of the labour market in low-paid jobs' (Murray, 1996: 60) . This change in language and policy explicitly shifted the burden of responsibility for unemployment rates from society onto the individual.
keep wages from rising and avoiding the inflation that would result from workers' pressure on wages and prices (Keynes, 1936; Cho, 2010) .
The 'New Deal' programme began in 1998 and aimed at restructuring the provision of welfare to the unemployed on the basis of these principles. 4 In line with liberal notions of entrepreneurship and human capital, through the welfare-to-work programme New Labour further severed the link between wages and labour and began to promote the latter as a generic form of human activity to be developed for its own sake and irrespective of economic remuneration and disparities. This was in line with a move from a Keynesian approach to promote the growth of the labour market by intervening on the side of demand, to a more Schumpeterian approach where 'state intervention is concentrated primarily upon supply-side measures to promote economic participation within relatively liberated market economics' (Alcock et al., 2003: 68) .
This policy also generated a profitable job brokering business through the outsourcing of welfare services to private companies and the voluntary sector. Incapable of addressing the causes of unemployment, the New Labour government claimed to address its social effects through a policy that aimed to 'activate' and reincorporate the unemployed within the labour market at all costs, irrespective of demand.
At the level of communications, these measures must make work attractive as a form of social integration. In this spirit, the term 'unemployed' was substituted with 'job-seekers' and 'benefits' with 'allowances', and New Deal put claimants (now 'customers') through training, subsidised employment and voluntary work, whilst couching these initiatives in the language of human capital understood as the individual's ability to produce an earnings stream. This move is of great symbolic power, as the unemployed, rather than being 'someone suffering from an economic disability' must be seen as a 'worker in transit' (Foucault, 2008: 139) . As the Italian political theorist Paolo Virno observes, This is irrespective of the situation of demand in the labour market: everyone agrees, without exception, that labour is and will continue to be the main instrument of social control and political legitimization of the state. Whatever assessment is given of the volume of social spending or of the self-regulating mechanisms of the market, there is no dispute over the necessity of linking the distribution of income to labour; this necessity must not be called into question in the political debate. The reason is essential:
wage labour represents the only possibility of systematically simplifying, and hence governing, the complexity of social relations. Labour as such, not money: in fact this complexity is rooted in monetary flows, and it is due to them that it expands. The science of administration retains its operational centrality to the extent that it is concerned with the administration of labour (Virno, 2007: 39) .
Geared to eliminate all externalities to the labour market and reabsorb every form of social activity within it, this process of integrative normalisation and discipline turns the benefit claimant into an irreducible figure of otherness to be eventually dispensed with. With responsibility to work now shifted onto the individual's shoulders, and the added burned of the punitive threat if they should not find employment, three years into the New Deal programme the New Labour government launched a marketing campaign against benefit fraud. As part of a series of 'tough measures' the government started pointing its finger at the 'benefit thief'. My claim is that the construction of the discourse on benefit fraud played a crucial role in the New Labour government's marketing of its role and legitimacy and I will examine how this was the case.
Subsequent to the 1998 Green Paper on social security, entitled 'Beating Fraud is Everyone's Business' (DSS 1998b) , in 2000 the government launched a campaign called 'Targeting Benefit
Fraud: Everyone's Business'. Government campaigning has grown to become a huge industry. 7 At the time, this was the most expensive campaign ever (Watt, 2001: 13 (Tinkler, 2010) . In August 2010, The Sun launched its own dedicated phone line: 'Today we call on our army of readers to help us crack down on welfare crime once and for all and bring the cheats to justice', backed by new PM David Cameron, who is now also contracting credit reference agencies to 'go after' the fraudsters. The important role of the tabloid press and the government reciprocal endorsement significantly broadened the avenues of the campaign. Importantly, tabloids and government adopt the same heightened, rhetorical language for effect. To contextualise the campaign in the broader political discourse in the British press, we have run a purely quantitative analysis of the recurrence of the expression 'benefit fraud' in UK national newspapers. becomes newsworthy in its own right and increasingly used to cause embarrassment to the government as a symbol its failure to control what had once been its constituency.
In the media discourse, tabloids have been acting as self-elected better 'spokespersons' for 'good, honest hard working people' and, whilst their influence on voters is often largely exaggerated (Sanders, 2003) , one could hardly underestimate their influence on the government (Curran and Seaton, 1981) . Faced with such embarrassing accusations, New Labour had to be seen to be doing something at all costs.
Governing a household, a family, does not essentially mean safeguarding the family property; what it concerns is the individuals who compose the family, their wealth and prosperity. It means reckoning with all the possible alliances with other families; it is this general form of management that is characteristic of government' (Foucault, 2000: 209) .
Governmentality concerns the household economics of the wealth of nations, and the household is increasingly reconfigured as an enterprise (Cooper and Mitropoulos, 2009) . Amidst a considerable amount of media pressure, to legitimate itself and project its own role as the good keeper of the household, New Labour launched the marketing campaign to display its 'tough' line on fraud: it could not be seen to allow crime on its watch. The language of 'toughness' and 'zero tolerance' and the emphasis on social policing is seen to be particularly effective at times of crisis to legitimate the role of the state, and in this case it was also New Labour's concession to the right. Agitated by the tabloid discourse, the state needed to respond to its agenda to recapture a sense of purpose.
At the time of the Murray-led debate on the underclass in the mid-1990s (Murray et al., 1996) , Labour were careful to avoid behaviourist explanations of its causes, and the stigma of a culture of poverty. 9 After some years in government, and having failed to make significant changes to its economic conditions, they were prepared to individuate the problem and morally stigmatise a particular group. The usefulness of the sociological category of the underclass was upset by its own complications, capturing as it did the public imagination before its sociological theorisation was formed. 10 One of its contradictions was its perceiving the poor as devoid of political subjectivity. The category of multitude, undergoing a recent resurrection in the hands of Italian post-operaismo, has a better explanatory power (Negri, 2003) because its political legacy 9 Marx's definition of the lumpenproletariat was in fact that it was not the working class, but the dregs of all classes of society: 'The lumpenproletariat, this scum of depraved elements from all classes, vagabonds, discharged soldiers, discharged jailbirds, escaped galley slaves, rogues, mountebanks, lazzaroni, pickpockets, tricksters, gamblers, maquereaus, brothel-keepers, porters, casual labourers, organ-grinders, ragpickers, knife-grinders, tinkers, beggarsin short, the whole indefinite, disintegrated mass, thrown hither and thither, which the French term la bohéme' (Marx, 1981: 34) . 10 As Jencks writes: 'Once the term entered the vernacular, however, journalists and policymakers inevitably began asking social scientists how large it was and why it was growing. Since neither journalists nor policy analysts had a clear idea what they meant by the underclass, social scientists had to make up their own definitions. We now have nearly a dozen of these definitions, each yielding a different picture of how big the underclass is and who its members are... It soon became clear, however, that those who talked about the underclass had something more in mind than just persistent poverty. The term underclass, with its echoes of the underworld, conjures up sin, or at least unorthodox behaviour. Low income may be a necessary condition for membership in such a class, but it is not sufficient' (in Murray et al. 1996: 11) encapsulates the crisis of sovereignty and the attempt to re-forge the public through fear of the state. The underclass has no political subjectivity. The multitude does.
Strategy and technique
In 2000 claiming as fraud when under many circumstances it is not, is factually misleading. Rather, the campaign creates a climate of suspicion and incites feelings of revenge in order to excavate a line in the social imaginary between tax-paying hard working people and people on benefits, coinciding with the age-old distinction between the deserving and the undeserving poor. The campaign foments a war amongst them and urges the former into action, to pick up the phone or fill in a report form. Expressions such as 'we're all in this together' and 'it's everyone's business' suggest that 'the government needs you' to tackle a societal problem (Connor, 2007) .
As Groves has noted:
In aligning the fraudster with the thief, burglar or robber, the government is seeking to elevate the fraudulent claimant to an object of, or indeed a target for, social contempt.
The government 'know' that there is a common view that benefit fraud is a victimless crime since there has been important government-funded research which explored attitudes towards benefit fraud in the late 1990s (Rowlingson, et al., 1997) . Again, this redefining of fraudulent action by the government has moral undertones (Groves, 2002: 134).
The 'No Ifs, No Buts' campaign raised the toughness a notch to the level of criminalisation. The emphasis is on fraud as a legally prosecutable offense and the campaign concentrates on its punishment: 'No ifs, no buts, break the law and you face an interview under caution and even a criminal record', 'When we catch you, you can face a criminal record and even a prison sentence'. Images in the adverts include a man reading a car magazine in a prison cell, and a woman under interrogation stressfully struggling to find words. Though 'fraudsters' are consistently portrayed as 'well-off', either shopping or contemplating the purchase of luxury goods, rather than social contempt, in this phase the campaign aims to advertise punishment as a deterrent. This is done whilst highlighting the shock of the 'benefit thief', the anxiety at being caught, the stress of sitting at an interrogation table, agitation.
In the 'We're onto you' phase, the campaign adopts war metaphors worthy of psychological operations techniques and reaches its most threatening tones. The government is doing more than tackling a problem: it is waging a war on it. Having advertised the punishment for the crime, it must now make a show of its ability to catch the criminal. In the adverts, a deep and raucous male voice, like that used in blockbuster war film trailers, recites a series of frightening threats ('We are closing in', 'There is nowhere to escape') accompanied by the image of a moving circle of light, as a gun sight closing in on a red target. An advert is shot from a helicopter that hovers over neighbourhoods, casting the circle of a search light over dark streets at night, and magically entering a house from underneath the door: 'If you claim you're living alone and you're not, we can check your bills', or stalking the invisible criminals, night workers such as a pizza delivery man who looks 'suspicious': 'If we think you are committing benefit fraud, we can come out and pay you a visit'. The government has not lost its grip, quite the opposite: like a sniper, it sees and fires without being seen, it is everywhere.
Effectiveness
Data on the effectiveness of the campaign is unavailable, not surprisingly. In 2006, the National Audit Office reports that 'the Department is currently spending £1.50 to identify £1 of overpayments'.
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Benefit fraud: facts Subsequent to the publication of a benefit officer's expose (Page, 1971 ) the government launched its first inquiry into benefit fraud in 1973. In 1980, it estimated that 2% of benefit spending was lost on fraud, and allocated a generous budget to investigating it. This figure is widely cited but also highly contested. When pressed to explain its origins in the House of Commons, Baron Prentice declared: 'There is no need to ring around department stores to know that they, and other large commercial organisations, assume a loss through fraud of 1 or 2% in their operations. Applying that to the DHSS, with its expenditure of £20 billion a year, leads to an estimated figure of £200 million' (HC, 1980 This highlights the extent of the government's resolve to implement a 'general regulation of society by the market' (Foucault, 2008: 145) , rather than acting to address problems that the market actually creates. At stake is an economy of power and the management of the unemployed and benefit claimants, irrespective of its costs. The campaign aims to create a climate of fear and suspicion, and the sense that the government is in control. The issue is strictly political, that of addressing a legitimation crisis in the face of a section of society that 13 For a breakdown over the past nine years, see Tinkler, 2010 . Also, the DWP states: 'In 2009-10, the proportion of total estimated overpayments due to fraud and error increased from 2% to 2.1% of benefit expenditure, compared to the previous set of estimates for 2008-09. [...] There has also been a substantial rise in total benefit expenditure from £135.9 billion in 2008-09 to a forecasted £148.0 billion in 2009-10, which is one reason why the estimates of fraud and error in money terms have increased. These are the first results to fully reflect the impact of the economic downturn' (DWP, 2010: 42) . To put things in perspective, the tax gap, or evasion, in Britain is currently calculated at £ 120 billion. On the relation of benefit fraud to the tax gap, see the Public and Commercial Services Union campaign 'There is an alternative: The case against cuts in public spending'[http://www.pcs.org.uk/en/campaigns/campaignresources/there-is-an-alternative-the-case-against-cuts-in-public-spending.cfm] 14 While Citizens Advice Bureaus enquiries continue to rise (2010 saw an 18% increase on previous years), with benefits inquiries being the second largest service area after debt, the Comprehensive Spending Review has announced substantial cuts on Legal Aid Funds. See Legal aid cuts will exclude most vulnerable from access to justice, Citizens Advice Chief Executive warns' [http://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/press_20101112] 15 In his analysis of the manipulation of statistics on the issue, Spickers has noted that 'it looks as if the Benefit Agency has taken a bicycle pump to the figures, inflating them at every stage of the process -in the initial assumptions, the acceptance of suspicion as fact, the estimate of value, the inclusion of further material on 'low suspicion', the extension of assumptions to benefits which have not been investigated, and a liberal rounding up of all the totals' (Spickers, 1999: 5) . 16 This has seen the proliferation of fake recovery agencies randomly issuing threatening letters to UK households, to the point that the Office of Fair Trading in 2003 has issued official guidance on how to deal with these 'unfair business practices'.
[The document is available online at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/business_leaflets/consumer_credit/oft664.pdf] Some of these agencies have gone as far as to set up fake 'information' blogs on benefit fraud. Arguably, the outsourcing of debt recovery is an expenditure that could be used instead to address the problem of solving the error that counts for two thirds of the issue misleadingly classified as 'fraud'. The campaign's fear mongering tactic is pure agitation. As we have seen, information, whether accurate or deliberately deceitful, is absent from the campaign. The government is not marketing a particular social policy. It is not engaged in propaganda or mass persuasion. There is no argument to be made. The government is making threats, aggrandising itself and its own resources, waging a war on crimes against welfare and by extension on welfare recipients as a whole: potential suspects. Through fear, agitation aims to discipline social relations into the workforce, irrespective of debates on economic costs or gains. These can no longer fill the void of political legitimacy. Lenin wrote that 'without a clear, well thought out ideological content, agitation degenerates into phrase mongering' (Lenin, 1974: 342) . But in the context of governmentality, agitation is a biopolitical tool to kick the social body into shape. The phrases are commensurate, on message, and agitate the linguistic level, innervating it and shaping discourse by key words and spin. The case of this campaign is extreme, but it points to another side of agitation: agitation not only as the process of agitating, urging and stirring up, but also as a state of turmoil, uneasiness, anxiety and unrest. In a Stalinist drive, by campaigning agitation New Labour displays its own state of restlessness; it is forced to transfigure its incapacity to act into an aesthetics of the act itself, the doing something: watching, prosecuting. Agitation is its last resort. 17 The Joseph Rowntree foundation has published research advocating the rise of job seekers allowance to match minimum standards of living at least up to the government's declared income poverty line (Kenway 2009 ).
Given the economic recession and rising unemployment, current austerity measures are already finding strong opposition. Draconian campaigns such as the one described are unlikely to have any more success than they have had so far. If anything, they will exacerbate the crisis of representation and increase levels of resistance and disobedience. During the recent expenses scandal, people produced adverts mimicking the language, visuals and symbols of the 'We're closing in' government campaign, this time, pointing to MPs as the real benefit fraudsters. But irrespective of the visibility and political articulation of multitudinal practices, the nonrepresentable, non public, and not necessarily legal form of association of non-aligned social singularities, they keep threatening the legitimacy of the state and resisting its techniques of governmentality (Bove and Empson, 2002) . For this, what it displays is the government's fear of the multitude, the government's own agitation at the presence of an unmanageable and growing other. Murray warned: 'we don't know how to make up for the lack of a community that rewards responsibility and stigmatises irresponsibility. Let me emphasise the words: we do not know how. It's not money we lack, but the capability to social-engineer our way out of this situation' (Murray et al., 1996: 51) . If you cannot change a situation, the next best thing is to make it look as if you are. The government's approach to welfare has increasingly this character but at every point it meets, in the form of the multitude, its projected other and its nemesis, resistant to social-engineering, unidentifiable, non-representable, swarming, unaccountable, criminal, non-committal, evasive, networked, and irreducible.
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